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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, APSCME, AFL-CIO, SUNY AT 
BIN6HAMT0N LOCAL 648, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13622 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW YORK AT BINGHAMTON), 
Respondent. 
NANCY HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (JULIE SANTIAGO 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
SUNY at Binghamton Local 648 (CSEA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT). CSEA's charge against the State 
of New York (State University of New York at Binghamton) (State) 
alleges that the State violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it required three unit 
employees to obtain a Non-Commercial Driver's License Class C 
(Non-CDL C). The ALJ held that the three employees, one a 
j laborer, one a stores clerk II (senior stores clerk), and one an 
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electrician, could be required in the course of their job duties 
to operate a vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) 
between 18,001 and 2 6,000 pounds. Operators of vehicles with 
that GVWR require a Non-CDL C license under the State's Vehicle 
and Traffic Law. As such, acquisition of the Non-CDL C license 
was held by the ALJ to be part of the essential aspects of the 
employees' basic employment functions or related incidental tasks 
and, therefore, the State's issuance of that licensing directive 
was a nonmandatory subject of negotiation under our decision in 
Waverly Central School District (Waverly).-' 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in relying 
upon Waverly because the employees in issue had never in the 
course of their employment driven a vehicle with a GVWR requiring 
a Non-CDL C license. Therefore, according to CSEA, the operation 
of those vehicles could not be part of their jobs. Moreover, 
CSEA argues that the predominant effect of the licensing 
requirement is on wages, not job assignments, because of the 
additional costs of acquiring that type of license. 
The State argues in response that the ALJ was correct in 
holding that the licensing requirement was not mandatorily 
negotiable. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ in part and reverse in part. 
ix10 PERB 53103 (1977) . 
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The negotiability of the licensing directive necessitates a 
determination preliminarily as to whether the operation of 
vehicles requiring a Non-CDL C license is part of the essential 
aspects of any of the employees7 basic employment functions or 
related incidental tasks. 
The ALJ held that the operation of vehicles with a GVWR 
requiring a Non-CDL C license was integrally connected with all 
three employees' job assignments and that their job descriptions 
encompassed the operation of this class of motor vehicle. We 
agree that the operation of vehicles requiring a Non-CDL C 
license is a task incidentally related to the performance of the 
duties required of the laborer and the senior stores clerk. That 
is sufficient under Waverly to render the issuance of the 
licensing directive as to those two positions a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiations. 
Neither incumbent of the laborer and the senior stores clerk 
positions had driven the type of vehicles requiring, since 
February 19, 1991, a Non-CDL C license before the date the State 
directed them to obtain that license. That is a relevant factor 
in the analysis, but it is not dispositive when the job 
descriptions for these two positions require at least the 
occasional operation of this class of motor vehicle. The 
position description for a laborer-7 specifically states that 
-
7The laborer's job description states that "in the pick up and 
delivery of items . . . [the laborer] may in the event of need be 
required to drive the vehicle." 
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the incumbent may occasionally be required to operate self-
propelled equipment. Listed as a qualification for the laborer 
position is a "driver's license appropriate for the type of 
vehicle to be operated". The delivery and pick up of various 
articles is within the very broad scope of a laborer's duties as 
described in the job description and the operation of the 
delivery van is reasonably required as an incidental part of 
those duties. Lawful operation of that van necessitates a Non-
CDL C license. 
The job description of the senior stores clerk incorporates 
the duties of a stores clerk, which include, as with the laborer, 
the occasional operation of a motor vehicle to pick up and 
deliver supplies.-7 Although less general than the laborer's 
position, the job description for the senior stores clerk 
similarly encompasses the driving of the delivery van on 
occasion. 
CSEA argues alternatively in support of the mandatory 
negotiability of the licensing directive that the Non-CDL C 
license costs the employees more than the licenses they have for 
their personal vehicles. This added cost, argues CSEA, makes the 
predominant effect of the State's directive on wages. In making 
this argument, CSEA relies on our cases in Sackets Harbor Central 
-
7As stated on the job description, a stores clerk may 
"occasionally operate a motor vehicle to pick up and deliver 
supplies." 
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School District (Sackets Harbor)-7 and South Jefferson Central 
School District (South Jefferson) .-7 In those cases, we held 
that employers had unilaterally changed terms and conditions of 
employment by assigning teachers extracurricular duties which 
lengthened the employees' workday even though those 
extracurricular duties were inherently part of the teachers' 
occupation. Those cases, however, are not relevant here. Having 
found that the operation of vehicles requiring a Non-CDL C 
license is already part of the laborer's and senior stores 
clerk's positions, there is no change in the conditions of 
employment of those two employees. Moreover, in South Jefferson 
and Sackets Harbor, it was the employers which imposed the 
increase in hours on the employees in their employer capacity. 
In this case, the State did not impose any job related 
requirements on any unit employees in its employer capacity. The 
licensing requirements under the Vehicle and Traffic Law are 
directed to the public at large in the State's capacity as 
sovereign and as an aspect of its control over the regulation of 
motor vehicles generally. Any costs incurred by the employees in 
conjunction with securing the necessary license can be addressed 
in the context of any impact bargaining as may be demanded. 
Whatever impact bargaining obligations there may be, however, do 
^13 PERB ^3058 (1980). 
^13 PERB 13066 (1980). 
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not deprive the State of its separate right to issue the 
licensing directive.-7 
We reach a different conclusion than did the ALT, however, 
with respect to the electrician. Unlike the laborer's and the 
senior stores clerk's, the electrician's job description does not 
support a conclusion that the operation of a motor vehicle 
requiring a Non-CDL C license is reasonably a part of the 
electrician's job. Operation of a motor vehicle is not listed 
among the duties or qualifications for the electrician's 
position. The State required the electrician to obtain the 
Non-CDL C license because it believed that he might have to 
operate a vehicle requiring such a license in the course of his 
duties, specifically a boom truck with an attached bucket. 
Although the electrician may be required to go into and up in the 
bucket in the course of installing, maintaining or repairing 
elevated electrical devices such as lights or traffic signals, 
nothing in the record evidences that the electrician is 
responsible for driving the necessary equipment to the site. 
Indeed, there is no evidence in the record to show that the 
electrician had to drive any vehicle in the course of his duties. 
As to the electrician, therefore, the licensing directive is 
unrelated to the duties required of that position and, therefore, 
was subject to a prior bargaining obligation which the State 
admittedly did not honor. 
^Town of Oyster Bay, 12 PERB f3086, aff'g 12 PERB f4510 (1979) . 
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For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision as it 
applies to the laborer and senior stores clerk is affirmed and 
CSEA's exceptions in those respects are dismissed, as is the 
charge to that extent. The ALJ's decision as it applies to the 
electrician is reversed and CSEA's exceptions in that respect are 
granted. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. The State rescind any requirement that the incumbent of 
the electrician position in issue hold a Non-CDL C 
license and pay the current incumbent of that position, 
Paul Hudzina, the amount expended by him to obtain that 
license with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate. 
2. Sign and post notice in the form attached in all 
locations at which notices of information to unit 
employees are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
£4~fct*4l Paul ine R.~ rKirisella/ ' Chairperson 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Membe|i 
Eric/D". Schmertz, Membe'r 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, SUNY at Binghamton Local 648 that the State of New York (State University of New York at Binghamton) will rescind 
any requirement that Paul Hudzina, an electrician, hold a Non-Commercial Driver's License Class C and will pay Paul Hudzina 
the amount expended by him to obtain that license with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
State of New York (State University of New York at Binghamton) 
B B B B B B B B B B B t ) B B S B « P • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
r-'s Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
^ . Any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KINGS PARK CLASSROOM TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION/ 
NYSUT, APT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14218 
KINGS PARK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
STEPHEN M. BLUTH, for Charging Party 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG, GROSS, RICHMOND, HEIDELBERGER, 
REICH & SCRICCA (ANNA M. SCRICCA of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Kings Park 
Central School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the Kings 
Park Classroom Teachers' Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Association). The Association alleges in its charge that the 
District violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it formally reprimanded 
teacher and Association vice-president Roger Kinsey for a comment 
he made in a column he submitted to the Association's paper, The 
Voice of 1812. 
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The ALJ held that Kinsey's comments were protected under the 
Act such that the District's reprimand of him for making them 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c). The ALJ dismissed the charge in 
all other respects and no exceptions have been taken to those 
aspects of her decision. 
The District argues in its exceptions that Kinsey was not 
engaged in statutorily protected activity when he made his 
comment regarding honor students at the District's William T. 
Rogers Middle School and that the ALJ should have dismissed the 
charge because there is no proof that the District was improperly 
motivated in issuing him the reprimand. 
The Association argues that the ALJ was correct in her 
findings of fact and her conclusions of law and should, 
therefore, be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties7 
arguments, we reverse the AKT's decision on the ground that 
Kinsey's comment was not protected under the Act. Accordingly, 
we do not consider any of the District's other arguments. 
The Voice of 1812 is distributed to teachers throughout the 
District via school mailboxes, but it is also accessible to and 
read by parents, administrators and community members. This case 
involves a column Kinsey wrote entitled Voice of 1812. NotIf 
which was published and distributed after the Association's 
December newsletter was released because he missed the paper's 
filing deadline. The portion of the column for which Kinsey was 
reprimanded reads as follows: 
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All things considered, this has not been a banner year 
to be a Kings Park teacher. However, it has produced 
some of the best humor I have ever heard, much of it 
unprintable even by my standards. Perhaps the 
quintessential comment is a bumper sticker recently 
seen which read, "My child beat up an Honor Student at 
the Middle School." Sounds like a best 
seller to me. 
The bumper sticker referenced in Kinsey's comment is a 
parody of a District program under which it distributes bumper 
stickers to the parents of honor students in the William T. 
Rogers Middle School which read: "My child is an honor student at 
Wm. T. Rogers Middle School." 
The principal of a District elementary school, who objected 
to Kinsey's reference to the bumper stickers, gave a copy of 
Kinsey's column to Mary DeRose, Superintendent of Schools, 
informing her that he had also received a complaint from a 
teacher who found the column objectionable. DeRose met with 
Kinsey and an Association representative and reprimanded him 
orally for ridiculing honor students and involving them in labor 
matters. The reprimand was later reduced to writing and placed 
in Kinsey's file with a directive that he refrain from this type 
of inappropriate behavior under threat of disciplinary action for 
noncompliance. 
The AKJ held that Kinsey had a protected right under the Act 
to write a column for the Association newsletter. As a broadly 
stated proposition, this is certainly correct. The ALJ also 
correctly recognized, however, that a generally protected right 
of an employee who serves as a union officer to write, publish or 
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distribute opinions in any given medium is not absolutely 
protected by the Act regardless of circumstance or the content of 
the remarks. The ALJ, however, held that the content of Kinsey's 
nonthreatening statements did not deprive him of the Act's 
protection because he did not enmesh students in a labor dispute. 
An enmeshing of students was the circumstance which deprived an 
employee of protection against a reprimand in an earlier decision 
involving this District.-7 
The fact that Kinsey's comments were not threatening and did 
not enmesh students in a labor dispute, however, does not 
necessarily make them protected under the Act. In the paragraph 
for which he was reprimanded, Kinsey makes it plain that he 
considers a bumper sticker proclaiming that one student had 
beaten another who is an honor student to be humorous and opines 
that many others would share that sentiment. As the ALJ 
observed, that comment was wholly unconnected to any labor 
dispute or to any other aspect of the employer-employee 
relationship. Kinsey7s remarks in relevant respect do not relate 
to any employee interests or working conditions and do not give 
any indication of an attempt to secure any benefit for teachers 
as employees. Fairly read, Kinsey's remarks constitute a public 
disparagement, however satirical or humorous he viewed it, of a 
District program, written without connection to the employer-
employee relationship. Such comments are not protected by the 
^Kings Park Cent. Sch. Dist. , 24 PERB [^3026 (1991) . 
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Act.^7 Because Kinsey was not engaged in activity protected by 
the Act in making and publishing the remarks in issue, the 
District's oral and written reprimands do not violate §2 09-a.l(a) 
or (c) of the Act.-7 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
with respect to the protected nature of Kinsey's comments are 
granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed insofar as she held 
the District in violation of §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
#~^ i y^v 
Pauline R. Kmse l l a , Chairperson 
Walte Eisenberg, Member y^ 
Eric J ./Schmertz, Member J 
g/NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW (Local 1229)(Jefferson Standard 
Broadcasting 00.1. 346 U.S. 464, 33 LRRM 2183 (1953), cited with 
approval in Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist. , 11 PERB [^3 043 
(1978) . 
-''Whether Kinsey had any other sources of right to make these 
remarks and whether the District violated any of those rights in 
its reprimand or threatened disciplinary action are issues which 
are not properly before us. 
2C- 4/25/94 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF CORRECTIONAL 
OFFICERS, LOCAL R2-110, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13872 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND AND ROCKLAND COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Respondents. 
EDWARD P. HOURIHAN, JR., ESQ., for Charging Party 
ILAN SCH0ENBER6ER, ESQ. (JOSEPH E. SUAREZ of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff (County) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT). The International Brotherhood of 
Correctional Officers, Local R2-110 (Local) is the bargaining 
agent for the County's correction officers, having replaced the 
employees7 prior union representative, which had filed the 
charge. After a hearing, the ALT held that the County violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally changed the starting and ending times of 
three existing shifts, unilaterally imposed a fourth shift and 
failed to negotiate the impact of those changes as demanded. 
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The County argues in its exceptions that its contract 
defenses necessitated the dismissal of the charge or at least 
warranted deferral of the charge to arbitration, that it 
negotiated the impact of the shift changes in good faith, and 
that the collective bargaining agreement waived any further 
bargaining rights the Local had regarding shift scheduling. The 
County also argues that it was forced to rest after the" Local had 
concluded its direct case because the ALJ had made rulings 
against it before and during the hearing. The Local did not file 
a response to the County's exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the County's 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Most of the County's defenses to its admitted changes in the 
shifts are grounded upon the collective bargaining agreement. 
The County relies upon that contract, under alternative theories, 
as a jurisdictional limitation, a basis for either a 
jurisdictional or a merits deferral, or a waiver of the Local's 
bargaining rights. 
The County's defenses based on a lack of jurisdiction must 
be dismissed. There being no grievance filed, a deferral of the 
jurisdictional issue to arbitration is inappropriate.-7 In such 
circumstances, our authority to proceed with the unilateral 
change aspects of the charge is an issue to be decided by us in 
the first instance. The record does not support the County's 
contention that the Local's president relied upon any provision 
^Erie County Water Auth. , 25 PERB 53017 (1992) . 
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of the contract as a source of right to the Local which prevented 
the County from making the shift changes in issue. The County 
relies in this respect on provisions in the contract covering 
meals and pay dates. The shifts are referenced in those 
provisions, but only to illustrate or clarify the employees7 
rights regarding the meals to be furnished them or the time 
paychecks will be distributed. We, therefore, affirm the ALJ's 
finding that the references to the preexisting shifts in the 
contract are merely incidental to the contractual meal 
allowances and pay dates and do not grant the Local any 
contractual rights to the maintenance of any shift schedule. 
The only contract provision even arguably relevant to the 
disposition of this charge is the County's management rights 
clause, which is the source of a waiver defense to the unilateral 
change aspects of the charge. A respondent's assertion of a 
contract right in defense of an improper practice charge within 
our jurisdiction is not a claim we have deferred on the merits to 
arbitration.-7 We would note, moreover, the practical 
difficulties presented by such a request because there is 
ordinarily no right under a collective bargaining agreement for 
an employer to file a contract grievance or to otherwise secure 
an interpretation of the contract apart from a grievance 
-
7State of New York (State Univ. of New York at Albany), 11 PERB 
5[3026 (1978) , aff'a 10 PERB f4578 (1977) (subsequent history 
omitted). 
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initiated by an employee or the employee's bargaining agent. In 
any event, no such employer right is prescribed here. 
We affirm the ALT's dismissal of the County's defense that 
the management rights clause clearly manifests a waiver by the 
Local of the right to bargain the at-issue shift changes for the 
reasons stated by the ALT. We similarly affirm her findings and 
conclusions regarding the County's failure to negotiate the 
impact of the shift changes. 
Finally, we find no support for the County's allegation that 
the ALJ's rulings forced it to rest. From our reading of the 
record, the County elected to move to dismiss the Local's charge 
and then rested because it believed that the Local had not 
established any aspect of the charge on its direct case. 
For the reasons set forth above, the County's exceptions are 
dismissed and the ALT's decision and order is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Rescind the shift changes put into effect on October 3, 
1992 and reinstitute the three shifts in existence 
prior thereto. 
2. Reimburse unit employees for any lost wages or benefits 
suffered as a result of the implementation of the 
October 3, 1992 work schedules, including any overtime 
lost by virtue of the schedule changes, plus interest 
at the maximum legal rate. 
Board - U-13872 
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3. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations customarily used to post written 
communications to unit employees. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^J.^ihJJ. i. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter, L. Eisenberg, Membe^ 
Eric J /"Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees of the County of Rockland and the Rockland County Sheriff in the unit represented by the 
International Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, Local R2-110, that the County of Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff: 
1. Will rescind the shift changes put into effect on October 3, 1992 and reinstitute the three shifts in existence 
prior thereto. 
2. Will reimburse unit employees for any lost wages or benefits suffered as a result of the implementation of 
the October 3, 1992 work schedules, including any overtime lost by virtue of the schedule changes, plus 
interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
County of Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
h" any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13598 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
JAMES KEMENASH, for charging Party 
WALTER PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. MCDOWELL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York 
State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge that the 
State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) (State) 
had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) by unilaterally discontinuing free analysis of 
laboratory tests for unit employees at the Downstate Correctional 
Facility (Facility) and requiring payment of lab costs from those 
employees who had received the free analyses in the past. The 
ALJ reserved decision on the State's motion to dismiss the charge 
at the close of PEF's direct case and ordered the State to put in 
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its evidence. The ALJ in her decision granted the motion to 
dismiss, finding that PEF had neither established a practice at 
the Facility of free lab test analyses for employees represented 
by PEF nor the State's knowledge that such a practice existed. 
Alternatively, she found that the State's sole witness had 
credibly testified that there was no practice as alleged and the 
State was not aware that employees had received any free analyses 
until a January 1992 audit. The State notified all unit 
employees that they were not to seek a free lab test analysis 
and, to the extent that they had received such a benefit in the 
past, they were to reimburse the State for its costs. 
PEF excepts to the ALT's decision, arguing that the record 
establishes the past practice of free lab test analysis and that 
the State was aware of the practice. The State supports the 
ALJ's findings and decision. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
The employees represented by PEF work in the Facility's 
health care unit. Lab tests conducted in that unit, whether on 
inmates or Facility employees, were at the times relevant to this 
charge sent to National Health Laboratories (NHL) for analysis. 
Tests on employees ordered by the Facility, such as a lead level 
test on corrections officers working as range instructors, a test 
on kitchen workers, and a test on clerical employees, all of whom 
are not in PEF's bargaining unit, and a measles test of several 
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employees, some of whom were in PEF's unit, were not charged to 
employees. Apparently, in anticipation of retirement, a 
management employee at one time also had some tests conducted 
without charge. There were also a number of occasions when 
employees, including some in the PEF unit, received tests for a 
variety of nonemployment related conditions, ranging from strep 
throat to pregnancy. Bills for all tests conducted by the health 
care unit which were sent to NHL for analysis, whether for 
employees or inmates, were sent to the Facility's business office 
and were paid. It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain 
from some bills whether the individual is an employee or an 
inmate, with the exception of pregnancy tests because there are 
no female inmates at the Facility. 
In January 1992, the Facility first became aware that there 
were non-job-related tests being analyzed when billing for 
pregnancy tests showed up in an audit of NHL being conducted by 
the State Comptroller. The Facility, upon investigation, found 
that fifteen of the thirty-nine employees in the health care unit 
had received personal,lab tests that had been paid for by the 
Facility. When NHL was questioned about these bills, it advised 
the Facility that the bills were in error because it conducted 
employee tests for free as a "professional courtesy". The 
Facility instructed NHL to stop analyzing any employee's personal 
tests for free and to give it a list of any other employees who 
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had had free tests performed by NHL.-7 The Facility then 
received two additional names from NHL. 
The Facility thereafter advised all employees that they were 
no longer to receive such tests, and to the extent they had 
received them in the past, they had to reimburse the Facility for 
the cost of the test and analysis. PEF demanded recision of and 
negotiations on this directive. This charge was filed when that 
demand was refused. 
PEF's charge centers on an alleged discontinuation of a 
mandatorily negotiable past practice. The ALJ noted correctly 
that for a practice to be established, for the purposes of the 
Act, it must be unequivocal, exist for some reasonable period of 
time and raise an expectation among unit employees that it will 
be continued.-1 Here, only during one measles outbreak did 
employees in PEF's unit receive a Facility-sanctioned test, at no 
cost to the employee. The other examples given by PEF involve 
nonunit employees who likewise received employer-ordered tests. 
Of the remaining individual tests which were billed to the 
Facility and which were not ordered by the Facility, only fifteen 
employees over ten years received an analysis of their lab tests 
The Facility advised NHL that such a practice was improper 
because employees were not allowed to have non-job-related 
tests conducted at the Facility and even if they were, the 
New York State Public Officers Law prohibited State 
employees from accepting such a benefit from NHL. 
See County of Nassau. 24 PERB f4523, aff'd, 24 PERB 53 0.29 
(1991). 
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at no charge to the employee. Of those fifteen employees, all 
that is known from the record is that they were assigned to the 
health care unit. Arguably, therefore, some of them were in 
PEF's unit. The ALJ determined that these few instances over the 
decade or more involved, did not evidence a past practice of 
Facility-provided free lab test analysis for nonemployment 
related conditions which was subject to a bargaining duty prior 
to alteration. The ALJ also found that there was no proof of 
knowledge by any agent of the State that some employees were 
receiving this benefit. There was no credible evidence offered 
to establish that any members of the Facility's management knew 
about the personal lab tests being analyzed by NHL.-7 The 
number of bills submitted each month and the method of listing 
patients and test types are such that it cannot be found that the 
Facility had constructive notice of the testing. The State's 
actions upon discovering the situation supports this finding. 
The State quickly moved to disabuse unit employees of any notion 
that this was a benefit to which they were entitled, either by 
contract or by practice. 
That one management/confidential employee had some tests 
conducted prior to retirement does not establish knowledge 
on the part of the State, or even the Facility, of the 
alleged practice. The testimony of one of PEF's witnesses 
that she had advised management, during the measles testing, 
that tests could be conducted for free for employees by NHL 
does not establish knowledge by any member of management 
that employees could receive personal lab test analysis for 
free. 
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Accordingly, PEF's exceptions are dismissed and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
ft J- 1.L JL 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
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This case comes to us on exceptions filed by William T. 
Bruns (Bruns) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (AKT) 
dismissing his charge, as amended, that the State of New York 
(Division of Parole) (State) and Security and Law Enforcement 
Employees, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82) had violated, 
respectively, §209-a.l(a) and (c) and §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act). 
At the close of Bruns' direct case, the ALJ, upon the 
State's and Council 827s motions, dismissed Bruns7 charge. Bruns 
excepts to the ALJ7s pre-hearing rulings, her denial of his 
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motion that she recuse herself,-/ certain of her rulings at the 
hearing and her finding that he had not made out a prima facie 
case. 
Bruns filed a voluminous improper practice charge on 
January 29, 1991, in which he made several allegations of 
improper conduct by both the State and Council 82. Bruns was 
twice advised by the Assistant Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) that his charge 
was deficient. In response, on February 19, 1991, Bruns filed a 
clarification of the charge which contained several allegations, 
including the claim that he had filed a grievance with Council 82 
on December 26, 1990, and had not yet been advised of its actions 
regarding that grievance. The charge, with this clarification, 
was assigned to the ALJ for further processing. 
Because of the number and complexity of allegations and the 
sheer volume of paper which accompanied the charge, the 
clarification, and Bruns' statements at the pre-hearing 
conference, the ALJ directed Bruns to file an offer of proof 
setting forth his allegations against both the State and 
Council 82 in a clear and concise statement with supporting 
facts.-7 Bruns responded with a document in excess of 100 
-^Bruns earlier appealed these rulings to us. We declined to 
rule on the merits of his appeal at that time, finding that it 
was interlocutory in nature. State of New York (Div. of Parole) 
and Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Council 82, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO. 25 PERB f3007 (1992). 
-''The ALJ also provided Bruns with copies of several relevant 
PERB decisions to enable him to limit his charge to cognizable 
allegations. 
Board - U-12252 -3 
pages, inclusive of supporting documents, setting forth sixty-
eight separate allegations of wrongdoing, primarily by 
Council 82. By letter dated September 23, 1991, the ALJ ruled 
that all but one of the allegations were untimely and/or 
conclusory (i.e., unsupported by specific factual allegations as 
required by §204.1(b)(3) of our Rules of Procedure). The ALJ 
scheduled a hearing on the following allegation, which referenced 
the handling of the December 26, 1990 grievance Bruns had 
included in his February 19, 1991 clarification of his charge: 
Christopher Gardner [Council 82's General Counsel] 
failed to process this grievance for Mr. Bruns and 
failed to notify Mr. Bruns he had not and would not, 
thereby rendering the grievance untimely. Council 82 
breached its duty of fair representation by failing to 
process this grievance in a timely manner and by 
failing to communicate the same to Mr. Bruns.-7 
The State and Council 82 denied the material allegations of the 
charge as clarified and amended by the offer of proof. The 
hearing lasted four days, all of which was devoted to Bruns' 
direct case. Bruns was represented by his wife and testified for 
-
7The ALJ also ruled that another paragraph of the offer was 
ancillary to the allegations against Gardner. It alleged that 
Walter Cavanaugh, who at that time was a Field Staff Coordinator 
for Council 82, had returned the referenced grievance to Bruns 
with instructions to file the grievance at step 1 of the 
grievance procedure because Council 82 could not take any action 
until a step 1 decision had been rendered or the time for the 
State to issue such a decision had elapsed. While finding that 
Cavanaugh's actions did not separately constitute an improper 
practice, the ALJ ruled that she would accept evidence about this 
allegation because it showed what happened to the grievance after 
it was sent to Gardner. 
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part of the first day of hearing.-7 Gardner was on the stand 
for most of the remainder of the hearing, having been called by 
Mrs. Bruns. Cavanaugh, also called by Mrs. Bruns, testified 
briefly on the third day of hearing.-7 Both Council 82 and the 
-'During the first day of hearing, it became apparent that Mrs. 
Bruns, who is not an attorney, was testifying during her 
examination of each witness. The ALJ swore Mrs. Bruns in as a 
witness and asked if everything she had testified to and would 
testify to was the truth. Upon Mrs. Bruns7 affirmation, the ALJ 
made clear that Mrs. Bruns was simultaneously questioning 
witnesses and testifying. On the final day of hearing, Mrs. 
Bruns advised the ALJ that she was the next witness. The ALJ, 
who had assured Mrs. Bruns earlier in the proceeding that she 
would be given an opportunity to testify in the narrative, ruled 
that, as she had received enough testimony from Mrs. Bruns during 
the course of the hearing and as it was unlikely that she would 
add anything new to the record, Mrs. Bruns was precluded from 
further testifying and closed the hearing. Shortly thereafter, 
the ALJ reconsidered her ruling and advised Mrs. Bruns in writing 
that she would reopen the record to hear her testimony following 
receipt from her of an offer of proof as to the nature of her 
testimony and its relationship to the charge. No offer of proof 
was submitted by Mrs. Bruns, who advised the ALJ that she was now 
reluctant to testify. The ALJ then confirmed that the record was 
closed and set a briefing schedule. 
-
7Bruns requested the issuance of three subpoenas ad 
testificandum for the appearance of Cavanaugh, Joseph Puma, 
Executive Director of Council 82, and Martin Kelly, Director of 
Parole Administration for the State. The ALJ issued the 
subpoenas to Bruns for service. The State and Council 82 
thereafter made motions to rescind the subpoenas. The ALT 
reserved on the motions and the parties then instituted 
proceedings to quash the subpoenas in Supreme Court, Albany 
County. Cavanaugh was voluntarily produced by Council 82 for the 
third day of hearing. The ALJ requested Bruns to make an offer 
on the record of the relevancy of the testimony sought from Puma 
and Kelly to the issue being litigated. Finding that the offer 
made by Mrs. Bruns established that their testimony would not be 
relevant to the issue before her, the ALJ rescinded the subpoenas 
for Puma and Kelly. Thereafter, by decision dated November 19, 
1992, Justice Conway confirmed Cavanaugh7s subpoena and quashed 
the subpoenas for Puma and Kelly. 
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State were present-/ and represented by counsel, who made motions 
to dismiss at the close of Bruns' case. The ALT reserved judgement 
on the motions, closed the record and accepted briefs from Bruns and 
Council 82.-7 
Based upon the following findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Bruns is a Warrant and Transfer Officer^ employed by the 
State's Division of Parole (Parole) in the Western region of New 
York. He is the only Council 82 unit employee, and member, at his 
facility. In March 1989, Bruns filed a grievance relating to 
overtime.-/ Thereafter, he filed a grievance complaining of the 
State's proposed use of Federal Marshals to perform unit work. From 
1989 to the time of the hearing, Bruns was involved in numerous 
grievances and other actions,—/ all of which were processed by 
-/The State, with the ALJ's permission, was present only for the 
last two days of hearing, as the only timely charge against the 
State was dependent upon proof that Council 82 had violated 
§209-a.2(c) of the Act by failing to process a grievance alleging 
that the State had violated the collective bargaining agreement. 
-/The State declined to submit a brief. 
-/He transports parole violators and prisoners from location to 
location both within New York and to and from the other states 
and New York. 
-/Bruns alleged in his grievance that he had submitted claims for 
overtime worked from July 7, 1988 through October 26, 1988 on 
November 2, 1988. As of January 19, 1989, when he made inquiry 
as to the status of his claim, he had received no information 
from Parole as to when he could expect payment. 
—
;A number of these relate to his ongoing dispute with Parole 
over the payment on his overtime claims as detailed in his 
March 2, 1989 grievance. The overtime statements and travel 
vouchers of Bruns and other Warrant and Transfer Officers came 
under some scrutiny by the Office of the State Comptroller's 
Management Audit staff and the Inspector General. 
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Council 82. Some of his grievances were taken to arbitration and 
some were settled by the State and Council 82 prior to, or at, 
arbitration. Indeed, by letter dated November 27, 1990, Bruns was 
advised by Brian O'Donnell, Esq., Council 82's retained counsel, 
that the bulk of his remaining overtime claims from 1989 would be 
paid in his December 19, 1990 paycheck.—7 O'Donnell noted that 
Kelly still had problems with some of the justifications for 
overtime offered by Bruns but at least Bruns would be getting a 
partial payment and that the issues in dispute would be narrowed for 
arbitration, which was scheduled for September 11, 1991. O'Donnell 
further informed Bruns by a letter dated December 14, 1990, that 
Bruns would be receiving a check for $5,055.00 on December 19, 1990, 
which would represent the undisputed amount of overtime which had 
still not been paid. Bruns did receive a check from the State on 
December 19, 1990 in payment for his overtime claims—7 and the 
check was for approximately $2700 less than what Bruns had claimed, 
based on the State's deduction for unauthorized time worked, for 
which Bruns had earlier been compensated.—7 
—
7This letter was part of Bruns7 pleadings and is attached to an 
ALT exhibit. 
—
7He had previously received other checks in partial payments of 
this, and other, overtime claims and travel vouchers. 
—
7We take administrative notice that Bruns filed an improper 
practice charge on March 23, 1992 (Case No. U-13349) alleging 
that the State and Council 82 had improperly settled this 
overtime grievance and all related claims at an arbitration held 
on February 19, 1992. That stipulation of settlement provides 
that Bruns receive $4,878.28 as final payment for all compensable 
hours worked by him in 1988 and specifically references the 
monies paid and later disallowed by Parole on December 19, 1990. 
Case No. U-13349 is being held pending the decision in this case. 
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Bruns and his wife appeared in Albany for an arbitration on 
December 20, 1990 on another of his grievances. He learned upon 
his arrival that the arbitration, which had been scheduled since 
February 1990, had been adjourned. He called Gardner for an 
explanation and Gardner agreed to meet with him at Council 82's 
Albany office. During their meeting, Gardner told him that the 
arbitration had been adjourned without date in the hopes of 
resolving the matter because Gardner was not optimistic about 
prevailing on the merits. He told Bruns that Robert Falzone, the 
Field Representative responsible for Bruns' geographic location, 
should have advised Bruns of the adjournment.—'' Bruns then 
detailed some of the difficulties he perceived in his dealings 
with Council 82, including his dissatisfaction with the manner in 
which the overtime grievance was progressing. He testified that 
Gardner then told him to file his grievances directly with him or 
bring any questions he had to Gardner and he would handle them. 
Gardner's testimony differs on this point. He claims that he 
"suggested to [Bruns] that if he was unable to reach Mr. Falzone 
and there was an issue he wanted some advice on, he should call 
me and I'd be happy to discuss that with him. I have never 
suggested to any Council 82 union member that they should file a 
grievance directly to me." 
—Gardner called Falzone at that time and asked him why he had 
failed to tell Bruns about the adjournment. Gardner told Bruns 
that Falzone had said he was afraid of Bruns and that was why he 
had not apprised him of the adjournment. 
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On December 26, 1990, Bruns sent a packet of documents to 
Gardner. It included a cover letter to Gardner,—7 a letter 
detailing Bruns' concerns about his "zoning" grievance and 
requesting that Gardner write a letter to Parole about the issue, 
a grievance form computer-generated by Mrs. Bruns and a two-page 
narrative of the details of the grievance. The grievance 
complains about a check dated December 19, 1990. It is the same 
check that O'Donnell had earlier explained to Bruns was in 
partial settlement of his overtime claims, the balance of which 
would be resolved in an arbitration already scheduled.—7 The 
grievance form, in the space for "date submitted", read 
"12/27/90". Gardner reviewed the packet upon his return from 
—'The letter read as follows: 
Dear Chris: 
Please find enclosed two (2) communications. The first 
is an article 8 grievance based on the state's (sic) 
recent action involving my overtime submissions for the 
year 1988. The second is a letter requesting you to 
write to the Division of Parole and/or the GOER 
advising them the "zoning" policy they implemented on 
August 8, 1990 is unsatisfactory to the union and the 
temporary arrangement is to end. 
—'The attachment to the grievance form states, in part: 
On December 19, 1990 the Finance Office, Audit and Control, 
Dept. of Budget and/or Division of Parole Director Martin F. 
Kelly, did violate Article 8 of the Security Services Unit 
Agreement by singling me out to enforce their interpretation 
of the FLSA concerning the payment of overtime. Their 
selective enforcement covers not only the time I have 
previously grieved and the time after the dates complained 
of in that grievance, but now time for which I have 
previously been paid has been deducted from that which the 
State has owed me since July 1988. 
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vacation in early January 1991 and acknowledged his receipt in a 
letter to Bruns dated January 14, 1991.—' Gardner testified 
that after he wrote to the Bruns, he had his secretary file the 
packet away in the office, for reference when, and if, the 
grievance went to arbitration. He believed that Mr. and Mrs. 
Bruns had sent him the grievance form as a courtesy copy because 
it indicated that it had been submitted on December 27, 1990 and 
it was not signed. Gardner further testified that he does not 
become involved with a grievance until the arbitration stage and 
that the contractual grievance procedure and Council 82's 
practice contemplate that the grievant will file the grievance at 
the first step, unless it is a grievance with regional or 
statewide implications, in which case a representative of Council 
82 may file. 
In the letter, Gardner noted: 
I am responding to your recent correspondence regarding 
grievances which you have filed concerning zoning of 
overtime assignments and the retroactive deduction of 
overtime payments. 
Your grievance regarding the retroactive deduction of 
overtime payments raises some important issues and may 
well have to be arbitrated. However, prior to that 
action being taken, the grievance must proceed through 
step 3 of the grievance procedure. 
In regard to your grievance concerning the zoning of 
overtime assignments, I am less clear regarding exactly 
what is at issue, and I suggest that you review this 
issue with Bob Falzone as the matter proceeds through 
the grievance procedure. Bob has a much greater 
familiarity with the history and background of that 
issue, as well as its full ramification. 
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The Bruns were advised by their private attorney, Vincent 
Moyer, by letter dated January 28, 1991, that he had spoken with 
Gardner. He went on to note: 
Mr. Gardner informed me that he had received the 
grievance that you filed for the disallowance and 
deduction made by the Division of Parole for two 
thousand six hundred ninety two dollars and twenty nine 
cents ($2,692.29). He indicated that this grievance 
would have to proceed through the steps that are set 
forth in the collective bargaining agreement. He 
indicated that he had already sent you a letter 
concerning this matter and would be corresponding with 
you in the future concerning his progress on this 
particular grievance. 
Bruns alleged in the February 19, 1991 clarification of 
his improper practice charge that his grievance was filed on 
December 26, 1990 and Council 82 had taken no further action at 
that point. Gardner testified that after he received a copy of 
the instant charge and its clarification in mid-March, he and 
Bruns had a telephone conversation during which he became aware 
that Bruns thought Gardner had filed the grievance and he made 
Bruns aware that he had not because he thought Bruns had filed 
the grievance.—/ 
—'Gardner originally testified that he recalled having several 
phone conversations with Bruns and/or his wife on a variety of 
issues. Bruns subpoenaed Council 82's telephone records for the 
period of December 1990 through March 1991. These records reveal 
that there were no phone calls made to the Bruns from Council 
82's Albany offices during that time frame. Gardner then 
conceded that he had made a mistake in his earlier testimony. He 
referred to his December 20 meeting with the Bruns, his January 
1991 telephone conversation with their attorney and his March 
1991 telephone conversation with Bruns as the specific instances 
when he spoke directly to Bruns or his representatives. He 
testified that he might have had some other conversations with 
the Bruns at times not covered by the subpoenaed telephone 
records. 
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Cavanaugh testified that by letter dated March 22, 1991, he 
had returned two grievances to Bruns because they had not been 
filed at step 1, but he could not remember which grievances they 
were. He further testified that he had not discussed the merits of 
either grievance with Gardner. Bruns testified that he believed 
that the two grievances that were returned to him were the one he 
sent to Gardner on December 26 and an additional grievance he had 
"filed" on March 14, 1991.—/ The Bruns were not able to produce 
at the hearing either the original or a copy of the grievance form 
they had sent to Gardner as part of their packet.—7 Both Gardner 
and his counsel stated at the hearing that they had never been in 
possession of the original of the December 26 grievance. 
—'This grievance also dealt with the use of Federal Marshals for 
the service of papers and the transport of parole violators 
lodged out of state. 
—'The grievance form in evidence is one produced by Council 82 
pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum issued by PERB. Gardner 
testified that the form in evidence is a copy of the only one 
found in his files and it is an accurate facsimile of the 
grievance he received from the Bruns. Mrs. Bruns indicated on 
the record that the grievance form had been produced by her on 
her computer, but that she believed that the one in evidence was 
not the one she had filed with Council 82 because it had "funny 
lines" on it. Although her requests that the ALJ, and also 
PERB's Chair, compel Council 82 to produce the original grievance 
form were denied, she concurred that the form in evidence was 
identical to the one she had filed, except that the form she had 
sent to Gardner had Mr. Bruns7 "fresh" signature on it. The ALJ 
found that in all relevant respects the form proffered was 
sufficient for the hearing and declined to order the production 
of the "original" by Council 82, which, in fact, Council 82 
claimed it didn't have. 
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Before we turn to the substantive exceptions in this case, the 
exceptions which relate to the processing of the charge should be 
addressed.—7 We must acknowledge that the charge, clarification 
and offer of proof submitted by Bruns are lengthy, conclusory 
and contain numerous attachments. Indeed, Bruns filed ninety 
separate exceptions to the ALJ7s decision. Most of the 
exceptions are directed to the ALJ7s attempts to ascertain the 
nature of the violations being alleged by Bruns and the proof he 
had in support of those allegations. Recognizing that neither 
Bruns nor his representative, Mrs. Bruns, are attorneys, the ALJ 
gave repeated, detailed instructions to them, both in 
correspondence and on the record, on PERB procedures and the 
requirements of proof as set forth in PERB decisions. Her 
attempts to narrow for litigation the numerous allegations to 
those which are timely and set forth a prima facie case were 
largely frustrated by the Bruns' continued refusal to heed her 
directions. After careful review of the record, we find that, 
in those instances where the ALJ exercised discretion, there was 
no abuse of discretion. We also find that the ALJ committed no 
reversible error in any of her pre-hearing or post-hearing 
rulings, or any of her rulings at the hearing. 
—'They include, but are not limited to, the ALJ7s direction that 
an offer of proof be filed, the denial of the motion to recuse 
herself, the recision of certain of the subpoenas, the denial of 
the Bruns' motion for particularization of the respondents7 
answers and the denial of Bruns7 motion for compulsory joinder. 
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Likewise, we affirm the ALT's decision that all but one of 
the allegations set forth in Bruns' offer of proof, which was 
properly treated by the ALT as an amendment to the charge, are 
untimely or are conclusory in nature, setting forth no facts 
upon which a finding of a violation by either Council 82 or the 
State could be based.—/ Indeed, the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation or the ALT could have 
dismissed the charge without having made the several efforts at 
clarification and simplification they did because Bruns' charge 
did not concisely state the grounds for the improper practice 
charge as required by our Rules. 
The one allegation that was litigated, that Gardner had 
failed to file the overtime pay disallowance grievance for 
Bruns, failed to notify him that he was not processing the 
grievance and, by doing so, rendered the grievance untimely, was 
dismissed on the merits by the ALT, who found that Bruns had 
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Gardner's actions were "deliberately invidious, arbitrary or 
—''The allegation that Cavanaugh improperly returned two 
grievances to Bruns in March 1991 was treated by the ALT as 
"ancillary" to the charge, that is, she took some evidence about 
this allegation to complete the chronology of events surrounding 
the December 26, 1990 grievance. Despite Bruns7 allegations of 
impropriety related to Council 82's instruction to him to file 
his grievances himself at Step 1, the charge did not set forth a 
separate prima facie case in this respect. An employee 
organization does not violate the Act by requiring unit members 
to comply with the grievance procedure and file grievances on 
their own at the first step. Just as an employee organization 
has no duty under the Act to process every grievance presented to 
it, it likewise has no statutory duty to process grievances at 
the first step of the procedure when unit members have an equal 
right to file on their own. 
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founded in bad faith."—f We affirm the AKT's decision, though 
on other grounds. 
A review of the record in this case, including Bruns' 
pleadings, persuades us that the grievance that Bruns sent to 
Gardner for filing was prepared in response to the receipt by 
Bruns of the check for overtime which was covered by the 
grievance he filed in March 1989. That grievance, and the 
amount of overtime payment due Bruns, were resolved by 
stipulation of settlement entered into by Council 82 and the 
State in February 1992. That settlement is the subject of 
another improper practice charge filed by Bruns. As the 
allegation in this charge is basically that Bruns has been 
inadequately represented by Council 82 with respect to his 
overtime claims, his charge must be dismissed. Bruns is correct 
in his allegation that Gardner did not file a grievance document 
dated December 26, 199 0. That fact, however, is immaterial 
because Council 82 did, in fact, represent him with respect to 
this claim. It had been representing him for two years and 
continued to represent him even after this charge was filed. 
His filing on December 2 6 with Gardner was redundant. By his 
own pleadings, Bruns shows that O'Donnell had already advised 
him of the deductions the State would make on his overtime claim 
and of Council 82's intention to proceed to arbitration to 
obtain the balance owed him. That Bruns was impatient with the 
^Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. PERB and Diaz, 132 A.D.2d 430, 
20 PERB 57024, at 7039 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 
73 N.Y.2d 796, 21 PERB 17.017 (1988). 
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grievance process and was seeking to put forward an additional 
theory in support of his overtime claim does not negate the fact 
that the very action he wanted Gardner to take had already been 
undertaken by Council 82. The Act does not require a bargaining 
agent to file every claim presented to it by a bargaining unit 
member; it certainly does not compel the filing of repetitive 
grievances. Therefore, as Bruns' concerns regarding overtime 
were already being adequately addressed by Council 82, we find 
no violation in Gardner's failure to file the December 26, 199 0 
grievance. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
/AC4Utl^ 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case is before us on exceptions filed by the Public 
Employees Federation (PEF) to a decision by the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director). PEF filed a charge against the State of 
New York (Department of Correctional Services) (State) which 
alleges that the State transferred PEF unit work to employees who 
are represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), in violation of §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). CSEA 
intervened in the proceeding and has filed cross-exceptions to 
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the Assistant Director's decision, as has the State. 
Specifically, PEF alleges in its charge that the work which had 
been performed at Collins Correctional Facility (Collins) by Kay 
Baase, an Inmate Records Coordinator II (IRC), was assigned to 
one or more of the CSEA unit employees she had supervised after 
she was transferred to a different facility as part of a State-
wide reorganization plan. 
PEF called only Baase at the hearing. After she testified 
on direct, on cross-examination and on a limited redirect, PEF 
rested. The State and CSEA then moved to dismiss the charge on 
the ground that PEF had not proven that the duties in issue had 
been performed exclusively by Baase. After a discussion with the 
parties, the Assistant Director informed them that he would 
either treat the motion to dismiss to include a failure to prove 
a transfer of unit work or he would consider a dismissal on that 
latter basis on his own motion. After receipt of briefs, the 
Assistant Director denied the motion to dismiss for lack of proof 
of exclusivity,-7 but he dismissed the charge because PEF had 
not proven a transfer of work outside of its unit. According to 
the Assistant Director, all that had been presented on the 
transfer issue was a stated assumption on Baase's part that the 
principal clerk in CSEA's unit took over her duties after she was 
transferred. The Assistant Director also denied PEF's motion 
made at the hearing to recall Baase and another witness to 
•^The Assistant Director ruled that there was sufficient proof 
that many of Baase's discrete duties and the overall 
responsibility for the functioning of the inmate records office 
were hers alone. 
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present evidence on the transfer issue. The Assistant Director 
denied PEF's request in this regard because it was made after PEF 
had rested and only after the possible inadequacy of its proof on 
the transfer issue had been called to all of the parties7 
attention and discussed. The Assistant Director believed that 
PEF had a full opportunity to present its case and to reopen the 
record at that point would be unfair to the State and CSEA. The 
Assistant Director did, however, afford the parties the 
opportunity to brief the sufficiency of the evidence introduced 
by PEF. 
PEF argues in its exceptions that the Assistant Director 
erred in dismissing the charge for lack of proof on the transfer 
of work issue and in denying its request to recall Baase and to 
call one additional witness, both of whom were then present at 
the hearing. 
CSEA and the State both argue that the Assistant Director 
was correct in dismissing the charge for the reasons he did. 
They argue additionally in their cross-exceptions that the 
Assistant Director also should have dismissed the charge for 
failure of proof of exclusivity. PEF supports the Assistant 
Director's ruling in this respect. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision. 
Whether pursuant to a motion of the parties or the presiding 
officer sua sponte, a charging party is entitled to a review of 
the evidence in the light most favorable to it, an assumption of 
the truth of its evidence and the benefit of all reasonable 
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inferences therefrom.-1 We agree with the Assistant Director's 
determination that no inferences may be drawn from Baase's stated 
assumption that her work was transferred outside PEF's unit 
because it is admittedly based wholly on an assumption.-7 The 
few facts in the record, even if they are assumed to be true and 
are read most favorably to PEF, cannot support a reasonable 
inference of a transfer of PEF unit work. The nature of the work 
performed by employees in the inmate records office, Baase's 
replacement by a CSEA unit employee when she was on vacation or 
otherwise off from work, and Baase's belief that another IRC was 
not appointed to succeed her at Collins do not support a 
permissible inference that any work of the IRC over which PEF 
arguably had exclusivity still exists and is being done by 
employees outside of PEF's unit. 
This leaves for consideration whether PEF should have been 
afforded an opportunity to recall Baase and question the one 
other employee it had wanted to call as a witness. In this 
regard, we conclude that the Assistant Director was correct in 
identifying and treating this request as a motion to reopen the 
record. Indeed, PEF itself characterizes its request that way. 
A motion to reopen is ordinarily appropriate for the introduction 
of newly discovered evidence. PEF's request is not premised on 
this ground. To the contrary, it was content to rest until the 
g/Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Buffalo, 
24 PERB 53033 (1991); County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB 
5(3013 (1984) . 
5/See Rupert v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 154 N.Y. 90 (1897). 
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Assistant Director pointed out to the parties that he had 
reservations about the adequacy of the proof regarding the 
transfer issue and invited the parties to brief that issue. To 
permit PEF to reopen under these circumstances would be plainly 
prejudicial to the State and CSEA and would not promote the 
orderly and careful investigation and presentation of proof. We 
see the issue in this respect to be most closely related to those 
circumstances in which a party has miscalculated the elements of 
a violation or the nature of its rights and responsibilities. We 
have not relieved a party from the consequences of those 
decisions in the past and see no reason to do so here.-/ 
PEF argues, however, that the Assistant Director should have 
permitted it to reopen the record after it had rested because 
§204.7(d) of our Rules of Procedure makes it "the duty of the 
Administrative Law Judge to inquire fully into all matters at 
issue to obtain a full and complete record." Whatever else this 
rule may mean in other contexts, in the context of a motion to 
dismiss, it does not have the meaning ascribed to it by PEF. PEF 
would transform this rule from one arguably imposing duties upon 
an Administrative Law Judge as an aid to the Board to one which 
is a source of right to the litigants in an improper practice 
proceeding. Under PEF's interpretation, §204.7(d) affords a 
party an entitlement to reopen a record at any point in the 
proceedings to introduce additional evidence, whether to 
-
7See, e.g.. Erie County Water Auth., 27 PERB 13010 (1994); City 
of Yonkers, 10 PERB 13020 (1977). 
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supplement a record or, as in this case, to respond to an 
observed deficiency in that party's case. Section 204.7(d) is 
not intended to afford any party an automatic "escape hatch" 
which would hold them harmless from any decisions which they may 
have made in the investigation, filing or litigation of an 
improper practice charge. As noted by the Assistant Director, 
the record was clear and sufficient to enable him to decide the 
issues which had been raised. We do not read the Assistant 
Director's statements as an invitation to reopen a record for a 
party which had ample opportunity to present its case and had 
rested. It was only an invitation to file a brief on the 
transfer issue. Section 204.7(d) of the Rules in this context 
required nothing more of the Assistant Director nor did it grant 
PEF any additional rights. 
Having affirmed the Assistant Director's dismissal, we do 
not reach the cross-exceptions. 
For the reasons set forth above, PEF's exceptions are 
dismissed and the Assistant Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
2G- 4 /25/94 
STATE OF KEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DEPOSIT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2 602, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14122 
DEPOSIT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
BRIAN L. LAUD, for Charging Party 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI (JOHN P. LYNCH of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Deposit 
Central School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) on a charge filed by the Deposit 
Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, Local 2602 
(Association). The Association alleges in its charge that the 
District failed to negotiate in good faith in its negotiations 
with the Association regarding a distance learning program in 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act). 
After a hearing, the ALT held that the District's conduct, 
taken as a whole during the parties' four negotiating sessions, 
evidenced a failure to negotiate in good faith. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the ALT's 
findings are not supported by the record and that her conclusion 
Board - U-14122 -2 
that the District acted in bad faith disregards §2 04.3 of the 
Act, which defines the parties' bargaining obligation.-7 The 
District also argues that we lack jurisdiction over the charge 
because the Association did not file a notice of claim pursuant 
to Education Law §3813. 
The Association argues that the ALJ was plainly correct in 
reaching her findings and conclusion that the District did not 
negotiate in good faith and that her decision should be affirmed, 
particularly because she discredited the District's witness where 
his testimony differed in any material respect from the 
Association's witnesses. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The District's jurisdictional defense premised upon 
Education Law §3813 is dismissed. The court decision upon which 
it relies is presently on appeal to the Appellate Division, Third 
-''Section 2 04.3 of the Act provides as follows: 
For the purpose of this article, to negotiate 
collectively is the performance of the mutual 
obligation of the public employer and a recognized or 
certified employee organization to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party, but such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
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Department, and, for that reason, we shall not follow the Supreme 
Court's decision at this time.-7 
On the merits, we consider the AKT's decision to accurately 
reflect our long-standing case law^ involving the parties7 
reciprocal bargaining obligations. Like §8(d) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, upon which §204.3 of the Act is based, 
parties are not required in meeting their duty to bargain in good 
faith to make any specific concession, nor are they required to 
reach any particular agreement. That is to say, the absence of 
any given concession or any given agreement cannot be bad faith 
per se. It is well established, however, that a party's failure 
to make any concessions or to reach any agreements are factors 
which may be properly considered in assessing a party's good 
faith. A party negotiates in good faith only by actively 
participating in deliberations so as to indicate a present intent 
to find a basis for agreement. The Act does not require parties 
to agree, but it does require that they negotiate with an open 
mind and with a sincere desire to reach an agreement if possible. 
As has been otherwise stated, "an employer is obliged to make 
some reasonable effort in some direction to compose his 
g/Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 26 PERB J[7011 (Sup. 
Ct. Alb. Co. 1993) (appeal pending). 
See, e.g., Town of Southampton, 2 PERB f3011 (1968) . 
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differences with the union" if the statutory bargaining 
obligation is to have any significance at all.-7 
The ALJ's decision shows a proper application of this 
standard. The ALJ stated the bases for her conclusions and we 
adopt them. Without engaging in unnecessary repetition, we find 
from the totality of record circumstances that the District did 
not approach these negotiations with a sincere desire to reach an 
agreement with the Association on the subject in issue. 
In reaching our decision, we reject the District's 
suggestion that its stated willingness to negotiate conclusively 
establishes its good faith. A party's stated intent is only as 
persuasive as its subsequent conduct corresponds to that intent. 
We similarly disagree with the District's contention that the 
Association's alleged bad faith justifies the District's conduct 
or exculpates it from the consequences of its own actions. If it 
considered the Association to be in violation of its duty to 
bargain, the Act's improper practice provisions afforded it full 
recourse. 
For the reasons set forth here and in the ALJ's decision, 
the ALJ's decision is affirmed and the District's exceptions are 
dismissed. 
-
7Reed & Prince Mfg. Co. , 96 NLRB 850, 28 LRRM 1608 (1951), 
enforced, 205 F.2d 131, 32 LRRM 2225 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 
346 U.S. 887, 33 LRRM 2133 (1953). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Negotiate in good faith with the Association regarding 
a distance learning program. 
2. Sign and post notice in the form attached in all 
locations at which notices of information to unit 
employees are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^ J , ^ ^JMPQ^U 
Pauline R. Kinsella^ "Chairperson 
Waltej^JL. Eisenberg, Member. 
Ericyfl. Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the Deposit Central School District in the unit represented by the Deposit Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, Local 2602, that the District will negotiate in good faith with the Association regarding 
a distance learning program. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
DEPOSIT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
this Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
2H- 4 /25 /94 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
LOCAL 20OB, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14603 
UTICA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS G. LEONE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
DONALD R. GERACE, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Utica City 
School District (District) to a decision by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALT) on a charge filed against the District by Service 
Employees International Union, Local 200B (SEIU). SEIU alleges 
in its charge that the District's board of education failed to 
vote on whether or not to ratify a tentative agreement which had 
been reached by SEIU's and the District's bargaining 
representatives. 
On a stipulated record, the ALT held in relevant part-7 
that the District's failure for more than seven months to take a 
i7The ALT dismissed one other allegation which SEIU raised for 
the first time in its memorandum to the ALT. No exceptions have 
been taken to this aspect of the ALT's decision. 
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vote on ratification of the contract violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
In its exceptions, the District argues that the ALT erred in 
limiting her review to the parties' stipulation of facts. It 
asserts that it understood that its response to the charge would 
be considered in addition to the stipulation and that a hearing 
would be held despite the stipulation. The District also argues 
that the ALT found certain facts other than those in the parties7 
stipulation and that the remedial order is inappropriate. 
SEIU argues in response that the ALT's decision and order is 
correct, that the District's exceptions are without merit, and 
that the ALT's decision and order should be affirmed. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALT's decision. 
The District's exceptions were filed by the District's 
attorney. The District was represented throughout the processing 
of the charge, however, by its Director of Personnel, James D. 
Tyler. The parties' stipulation is in writing and signed by 
SEIU's representative and Tyler. Nothing in the case evidences 
that the District considered the stipulation to be incomplete or 
that it was to be supplemented through a hearing. Quite the 
contrary, Tyler informed the ALT by letter that the District 
found "no need" to file a brief because it "submitted" to both 
the statement of facts as set forth in the charge and in the 
parties' stipulation. If the District believed at that time that 
a hearing would be held despite the stipulation, it logically 
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would have at least made an inquiry about a hearing when a 
briefing schedule was being fixed by the ALT. Its failure to 
demand a hearing or to even inquire in that regard is 
irreconcilable with the claim it now makes on appeal that it 
always understood a hearing would be held. It appears that the 
District merely changed representatives on receipt of a decision 
finding it in violation of the Act and that its current 
representative disagrees, perhaps in hindsight, with the 
judgements made by the former representative. 
We would affirm the ALT's decision, moreover, even if we 
were to consider the District's explanations for not acting on 
ratification of the contract. The District claims that its board 
of education could not consider the contract at any of the 
several meetings it held between November 1992 and July 1993 
because it was fully occupied dealing with other issues. The 
District, however, has an obligation under the Act to negotiate 
in good faith with SEIU, which includes a duty to vote on 
ratification with reasonable expedition.-'' The value judgements 
placed on the relative importance of the many issues which may 
occupy any board of education's time are not determinative of the 
parties' bargaining rights and obligations. The District may not 
relegate ratification of SEIU's collective bargaining agreement 
to last place on the District's list of priorities simply because 
it considers debate and resolution of other issues to be more 
g/Citv of Dunkirk, 25 PERB 53029 (1992) . 
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important. The short answer to the District's argument in this 
respect is that the board of education was duty bound under the 
Act to vote on ratification and that it had more than a 
reasonable amount of time in which to do that. 
The District also argues that the ALJ erred in finding facts 
not in the record, specifically that the contract was subject to 
ratification and that Tyler had entered into a tentative 
contract. Both facts, however, are stated in the parties' 
stipulation and the ALJ accurately reported them in the decision. 
Finally, the District argues that the ALJ should only have 
ordered the District to vote on ratification, not to execute the 
contract. The ALJ's order, however, is correct. Employer 
ratification of a contract is a privilege obtained by and 
belonging to the chief executive. It exists when properly 
reserved as a condition to the chief executive's otherwise 
absolute duty to execute on demand a writing embodying the 
agreements reached during negotiations. The chief executive 
alone, not the legislative body, has the right and duty to 
bargain and is responsible for any failure by the legislative 
body to vote on ratification within a reasonable period of 
time.-7 Failure to act on ratification, as required by the Act, 
waives ratification as a condition to the chief executive 
officer's duty to execute, which then becomes fixed and absolute 
3/ld. 
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pursuant to §2 04.3 of the Act.-7 For the reasons set forth 
above, the District's exceptions are dismissed and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Execute, upon demand by SEIU, the collective bargaining 
agreement reached by the parties in October 1992, 
effective July 1, 1992 through June 30, 1994. 
2. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to SEIU unit employees. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^LfUL 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
pkdteL - £ 
Waltexj L. E i s e n b e r g , MemKer 
4 / ld . 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees in the unit represented by the Service Employees International Union, Local 200B (SEIU) that 
the Utica City School District will execute, upon demand by SEIU, the collective bargaining agreement reached by the parties 




Utica City School District 
•fvs Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
any other material. 
3A- 4/25/94 
STATE OF HEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MAINE-ENDWELL CLERICAL ASSOCIATION, 
NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4195 
MAINE-ENDWELL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Maine-Endwell Clerical 
Association, NEA/NY has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4195 - 2 -
Unit: Included: Professional registered nurse, building 
secretary, accounts payable clerk, payroll 
clerk, coordinator secretary, guidance 
secretary, special services secretary, media 
center aide, transportation clerk, mail 
clerk/typist, office assistant, attendance 
clerk, switchboard operator/receptionist and 
monitor. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Maine-Endwell Clerical 
Association, NEA/NY. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
fa±.TtJ\. 
Pauline R. Kinsella^ Chairperson 
7. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric 3/C Schmertz, Member f 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4091 
ONONDAGA COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4091 
- 2 -
Unit: Included: Senior Engineer; Water Systems Chemist I; 
Assistant Water Maintenance Supervisor; Water 
Distribution Manager; Principal Plant Operator 
Type A; Water Meter Repair Supervisor; Account 
Clerk I; Peripheral Equipment Operator; Water 
Systems Construction Engineer; Account Clerk 
II; Water Maintenance Supervisor; Utility 
Billing Supervisor; Water Plant Manager Type A; 
Assistant Water Meter Repair Supervisor. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
\ hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
UttdU^)f, t^Z~&L 
Walter L. E i s enbe rg , Member 
E r i c J ^ S c h m e r t z , Member" 
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STATE OF MEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF WASHIN6TONVILLE POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4119 
VILLAGE OF WASHINGTONVILLE, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Washingtonville 
Police Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
found to be appropriate and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4119 
-2-
Unit: Included: All full-time police officers, including 
detectives and sergeants. 
Excluded: Chief of Police. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Village of Washingtonville 
Police Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: April 25, 1994 
Albany, New York 
V 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Erifc J. Schmertz, Member1 
